


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COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

RÉSUMÉ DE CONTRE-INGÉRENCE

June/juin 2011

CI INTSUM Covering the Period: (1 – 30 June 11)

Résumé de CI couvrant la période: (1 – 30 juin 11)

References: A. CI 760-001-09 (CFNCIU Standing Task)
B. DAOD 8002-1 (National Counter-Intelligence Program)

(U) Highlights:

Para 1: (S) Elicitation Relating to DND/CF

Para 3: (S) Unsolicited Contact of DRDC Scientists – Halifax, NS and Suffield, AB

Para 6: (S) Espionage Activity –

Para 18: (S) Espionage Activity –

Please note, the CI Monthly INTSUM can be found at the following locations:

- CSNI/WEB PUBLISHING: CDI / CFNCIU / Intelligence / INTSUM
- SPARTAN: CDI / Disseminated Products / Products by Originator / DND / Counter-Intelligence
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(U) DOMESTIC COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INCIDENTS

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(U) The following incident summaries are provided to identify and highlight the espionage threat to DND/CF technology, both in Canada and abroad. This information is being published to enhance the situational awareness (SA) of DND/CF and civilian personnel working in high technology trades and in defence research and development.

(S) PROBABLE ELICITATION OF CF MEMBER -

1. (S/ On a CF member attended a Security Conference in to deliver an unclassified presentation on DND/CF After the presentation, the CF member was approached by a representative of a civilian company who had participated in the conference. This individual asked the CF member a number of pointed questions regarding

While it is not unusual for presenters or panel members to be approached by vendors, the CF member felt the individual's questions were overbearing to the point of being suspect.

2. (S/ CFNCIU Analyst Comment:

No threat to DND/CF personnel or assets has been confirmed at this time. CFNCIU PR Det continues to investigate this matter.

(S) UNSOLICITED CONTACT WITH =

3. (S/ On received an e-mail In his e-mail, the expressed interest in the

indicates that it was sent from within e-mail

provided by the sender In both cases, the contact information

4. (S/ On it was reported that a had received the same request from a

SECRET/

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sent from a different e-mail account.

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replied to the

Open source searches revealed

5. (S/
similar requests

CFNCIU Analyst Comment: To date this year, six

It is noteworthy that in each of these incidents, the

investigate these

CFNCIU continues to
and enable appropriate defensive actions.

**(S) SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
INCIDENTS -**

(S) The following short summaries concern

*This information is being published to
enhance the situational awareness (SA) of DND/CF personnel deployed to, or visiting
RF.*

(S) SURVEILLANCE AND PROFILING OF CF MEMBER -

6. (S// In a CF member noted The CF
member had relocated to the National Capital Region (NCR)
Several months later,

On a few occasions, the CF member to address this issue,

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but no one ever answered the door.

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7. (S/ In the same CF member
He was

After the CF member
took the opportunity to strike up a conversation. inquired
explicitly about

8. (S/ CFNCIU Analyst Comment: Based on these two
related incidents, both of which occurred prior to the CF member's

DND/CF members who
should be aware that surveillance and profiling activity may occur

(S) PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE OF CF

9. (S/ In two CF from
while accompanying They
were stopped in front of the to look for
directions. An unknown male approached them and

10. (S/ On a separate occasion in a CF

After their visit, the women walked several kilometres to a nearby market. While they
were browsing, an unknown female approached the CF struck up
a light conversation.

11. (S/ CFNCIU Analyst Comment: These incidents are
examples of

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(S)
CAPABILITIES -

TECHNICAL COLLECTION

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12. (S/

13. (S/ During a CF member's stay in a
it was noted that there were

14. (S/

CFNCIU Analyst Comment:

DND/CF members traveling to

CFNCIU believes there is a possibility that

Through Defensive Security Briefings, CFNCIU informs DND/CF
members traveling to This
incident underlines the importance of taking part in Defensive Security Briefings
(DSBs) and Debriefings (DSDs) prior to foreign travel.

(S)

INTRUSION OPERATIONS -

15. (S/

A CF member conducting duty travel to

The CF member also indicated that he possessed a
personal USB stick which contained personal files. On one occasion,

16. (S/

A CF member deployed to

which she was not

permitted to use.

Because the CF member resided

17. (S/
examples of

CFNCIU Analyst Comment: These incidents are

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The application of new
has likely increased pressure on locals to
CF members traveling to should
assume that hotel rooms and personal residences may be equipped with listening
devices, and should never discuss matters of a sensitive nature or leave work-related
materials unattended.

**(U) SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
INCIDENTS -**

(S) DND/CF members deployed or traveling

*The following incidents
occurred between 2007 and 2010 and are provided to enhance the situational
awareness (SA) of DND/CF personnel deployed to, or visiting*

(U) GENERAL SECURITY ATMOSPHERICS -

18. (S/

Both
agencies are part of the same overarching construct, referred to collectively as the
which translates roughly to

19. (S/

There are security checkpoints throughout
the urban areas and a severe security presence in all hotels.

Likewise,
and the government shuts down the internet
whenever it feels threatened. Canadians working or visiting should be aware that
their activities may be monitored and that activities such as photography, loitering or
questioning the populace about the may be construed as highly
suspicious or as foreign interference.

(S)

INTRUSION OPERATIONS

20. (S/

Personal residences provided to DND/CF members
conducting duty travel in All keys are controlled by the local
landlords who give access to authorities when requested. Domestic cleaning staff
employed at personal residences will also give access to the authorities when requested
to do so. DND/CF members have reported their residences being inspected

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21. (S// DND/CF members deployed to s.15(1)

In addition, the Canadian Embassy is located adjacent to the

(S// TECHNIQUES, TACTICS AND PROCEDURES (TTPs))

22. (S// A DND/CF member who conducted duty travel to between 2007 and 2010 reported that

23. (S// Canadians living or working in often gather for social events at and at local popular restaurants.

(S// 24. (S//

25. (S//

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(U)
CAPABILITIES

TECHNICAL COLLECTION

26. (S/ CF members conducting duty travel to

27. (S// CFNCIU Analyst Comment: While the domestic security environment in has changed dramatically since the information reported, these incidents provide good examples of Currently,

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
Le but de ce résumé de contre-ingérence est d'informer et d'identifier les menaces possibles qui pèsent contre les Forces canadiennes (FC) et le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN), concernant le terrorisme, l'espionnage, la subversion et le sabotage, dans le but de réduire la vulnérabilité du personnel et des installations. De plus, le résumé présente certains événements d'intérêt pour maintenir la perception de la situation. L'information ou les renseignements peuvent également être protégés en vertu des articles 37 et 38 de la Loi sur la preuve au Canada. Cette information ou ces renseignements ne doivent être ni communiqués ni utilisés comme preuve sans consultation préalable avec l'Unité nationale de contre-espionnage des Forces canadiennes (UNCEFC)

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COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

RÉSUMÉ DE CONTRE-INGÉRENCE

July/juillet 2011

CI INTSUM Covering the Period: (1 – 31 July 11)

Résumé de CI couvrant la période: (1 – 31 juillet 11)

References: A. CI 760-001-09 (CFNCIU Standing Task)
B. DAOD 8002-1 (National Counter-Intelligence Program)

(U) Highlights:

Para 1: (S) Extremism: PROJECT

– Edmonton, AB

Para 4: (C) Espionage Activity –

Para 7: (U) Espionage Activity – Canvassing of DND/CF Members Via E-mail – Ottawa, ON,
Edmonton, AB, and Kingston, ON

Para 9: (U) Espionage Activity By Former F-16 Pilot – Netherlands (NLD)

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(U) DOMESTIC SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

(U) The following short synopsis concerns a concluded CFNCIU domestic investigation that is provided to enhance the reader's SA.

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(S) EXTREMISM: PROJECT

1. (S/

2. (S/

3. (S/

CFNCIU Analyst Comment:

(U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (FIS)

(C) PROFILING OF CF MEMBER -

4. (C/ On CFNCIU conducted a Defensive Security Briefing (DSB) with a CF member who planned to travel to with his wife in order to visit her family. The CF

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member's wife was born in [redacted] Following the briefing given by CFNCIU, and due to the nature of the CF member's position and the risk involved, a joint decision between himself and his superiors was made to cancel his non duty travel to [redacted] s.15(1)

5. (C) [redacted] The CF member's in-laws subsequently informed him that, shortly after the date he and his wife had been scheduled to arrive [redacted]

[redacted] The [redacted] was not verbally or physically aggressive; however, [redacted] Because the CF member's in-laws have never met him, they were unable to answer most of the questions.

6. (C) [redacted] **CFNCIU Analyst Comment:** This situation clearly indicates that the CF member was a person of interest for [redacted]

[redacted] The CF member indicated that he did provide his passport information and recent pictures with his Visa application. Given the nature of the CF member's work, he very likely has knowledge which would be of interest to [redacted]

[redacted] The [redacted] interest in learning the CF member's background may indicate [redacted] This incident highlights the importance of attending Defensive Security Briefings (DSBs) prior to foreign travel to regions of security concern.

(U) CANVASSING OF DND/CF MEMBERS VIA UNSOLICITED E-MAILS

7. (C) [redacted] CFNCIU Ottawa Detachment reported that on 04 Aug 11, a CF member received an e-mail at his work address [redacted]

8. (C) [redacted] **CFNCIU Analyst Comment:** To date, a total of five DND/CF members are known to have received this e-mail.

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Based on the fact that CF members' e-mail addresses are readily available on open sources,

Open source information shows that s.15(1)
 has also posted his request on various military and non-military websites. CF members who receive this e-mail are advised not to establish contact with

Any DND/CF member who receives unsolicited e-mail from a foreign national with a clear CI nexus should forward it to the nearest CFNCIU detachment. Any attachments on such e-mails should remain unopened until they are sent to CFNOC to be scanned for viruses and malware. CFNCIU continues to investigate foreign collection activity via unsolicited e-mails to CF members and DND employees.

(U) INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INCIDENT

(U) The following information has been provided by NATO partners to identify the various security intelligence threats being conducted against NATO personnel. This information is being published to enhance the situational awareness (SA) of DND/CF personnel deployed, or visiting various international theatres of operations.

(U) FORMER F-16 PILOT ARRESTED FOR ESPIONAGE – NETHERLANDS (NLD)

9. (U) According to Dutch media reports, Russia is involved in an espionage case involving a former F-16 pilot in the Dutch military. In April 2011, it became known that a Dutch pilot had been arrested for trying to sell classified information to Belarus. According to Dutch public broadcaster NOS, the F-16 pilot was arrested during a meeting with the defence attaché of the Russian Embassy. The Russian diplomat is said to have been recalled to Moscow under pressure from the Netherlands. The F-16 pilot had worked at Defence for 13 years and carried out bombing raids in Kosovo and Afghanistan. He acknowledged that he has financial problems.

10. (S/ **CFNCIU Analyst Comment:** The incident initially occurred in Mar 2011 when a former NLD F-16 pilot tried to sell secret information regarding upgraded A/C software, avionics, tactics and other sensitive elements related to F-16 technology to Belarus, who in turn passed him to the Russian Federation (RF) attaché in Netherlands (NLD), a GRU officer. The former pilot was arrested during a meeting with the RF Defense Attaché (DA) in NLD. The former pilot is being held in pre-trial custody because he was assessed as a flight risk. It is also assessed that he may flee if released on bail. This incident demonstrates that even a long-serving member in good standing can be exploited by a Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS), particularly if circumstances such as financial problems make the member more vulnerable. Following the initial CI investigation, NLD authorities expelled the RF DA. In return, the RF government expelled the former NLD DA in a reciprocal action. The former NLD F-16 pilot is to be tried in court on espionage charges in Aug 2011.

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
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COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

RÉSUMÉ DE CONTRE-INGÉRENCE

September/septembre 2011

CI INTSUM Covering the Period: (1-30 September 2011)

Résumé de CI couvrant la période: (du 1^{er} au 30 septembre 2011)

References: A. CI 760-001-09 (CFNCIU Standing Task)
B. DAOD 8002-1 (National Counter-Intelligence Program)

(U) Highlights:

Para 1: (U) MPQ Raises Public Profile – Montreal, PQ

Para 4: (U) Update on CFB Petawawa Bomb Threat – Ottawa, ON

Para 7: (U) Stolen Explosives – Sainte Sophie, PQ

Para 11: (U) Man Arrested in Plot to Attack Pentagon – Ashland, MA

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(U) DOMESTIC SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

(U) MPQ RAISES PUBLIC PROFILE - MONTREAL, PQ

1. (S/ On 20 Sep 11, Le Journal de Montreal published an interview with a "Major" PROVOST, second in command of the militia group Milice Patriotique Du Quebec (MPQ). In the interview, "Major" PROVOST states that the MPQ is training to defend Quebec from the rest of Canada in the inevitable separation of the province. Also from the article, the MPQ indicated its intent to build a secret training base to improve its member's ability to acquire skill in weapons handling and combat operations.

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2. (S/ The article included three pictures of "Major" PROVOST at an unknown firearms range location holding a VZ-58 semi automatic rifle, an unidentified pistol and a hunting type bolt action rifle with a telescopic scope. Other individuals can be seen in the back ground (NFI). Also included is a fourth picture of a group of unidentified suspected MPQ members participating in a General Salute.

3. (S/ **CI ANALYST COMMENT:**

This recent interview constitutes another change in the group's activities to date and demonstrates a much more public profile than before.

The group recently boasted that they now have members in all the regions of southern Quebec. It is expected that this interview may increase the positive exposure of the group to the populace and increase their recruiting opportunities.

END COMMENT

(U) UPDATE TO BOMBING THREAT TO CFB PETAWAWA - OTTAWA, ON

4. (U) On 17 Nov 10, police in Pembroke arrested Martin Abdul STANIKZY in relation to a domestic violence investigation. STANIKZY's wife presented police with a recording made in Jul 10 of STANIKZY allegedly making a threat to carry out an explosive attack at CFB Petawawa. STANIKZY has been held on charges of assault, attempting to possess an explosive substance, counselling to commit theft, uttering a threat to cause death and threatening to burn. He continues to be held in custody as he is considered a flight risk, is not a Canadian Citizen and is estranged from his Canadian Citizenship sponsor. Mr. STANIKZY has no family beyond his wife in Canada.

5. (S/ Mr. STANIKZY was not in possession of any explosives at the time of his arrest. Mr. STANIKZY was attempting to coerce his wife, an employee of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), to obtain explosives for him from her place of work, which she refused.

Although Mr. STANIKZY worked

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for a Pembroke pizza restaurant as a pizza delivery driver, it is unlikely he travelled to CFB Petawawa as part of those duties as the base is outside the normal delivery radius.

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6. (S/ **CI ANALYST COMMENT:** Some of the arguments between Mr. STANIKZY and his wife centered on his insistence that she quit her job at AECL and obtain explosives for him, which she could not do. On the day of the alleged battering against his wife, Mr. STANIKZY had realized that she could not obtain explosives for him.

rather than direct threats to the CF. There are no indications that at the time of his arrest, Mr. STANIKZY had the capabilities to conduct an attack on CFB Petawawa. The trial for Mr. STANIKZY is scheduled to begin on 20 Oct 11. CFNCIU will continue to monitor the situation. **END COMMENT**

(U) THEFT OF EXPLOSIVES IN SAINTE - SOPHIE, PQ

7. (C/ On 26 Aug 11, 900 kg of explosives, identified as gelatin nitroglycerin dynamite (brand name UNIMAX) was stolen from a storage location near Saint Sophie, PQ by a group of 4 or 5 armed, unidentified men. The thieves secured the two blasting company workers and then loaded the explosives into two vehicles.

8. (C/ **CI ANALYST COMMENT:** Initial police investigations indicate

The manufacturer's sales information on UNIMAX state the material can be used as a primer for Ammonium Nitrate and Fuel Oil (ANFO) and a variety of other demolition purposes. In another missing explosives case, on 01 Oct 09, a quantity of explosive boosters were stolen from a storage facility in Ottawa.

No threat to DND/CF personnel or assets has been identified at this time. CFNCIU is continuing to monitor these events through Partner Agencies. **END COMMENT.**

EXPLOSION AT RESIDENCE - ST JEAN SUR RICHELIEU, PQ

9. (C/ On 05 Sep 11, a crude IED exploded at a residence in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, across the river from the Canadian Forces Recruit School (CFRS). The explosion caused only minor damage and no injuries. **CI ANALYST COMMENT:**

No CI nexus was identified however, it is important to note that due to the proximity of this incident it is believed that CFRS staff could potentially become collateral victim of any **END COMMENT**

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(U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (FIS)

10. (U) NSTR

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(U) INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INCIDENT

(U) MAN ARRESTED IN PLOT TO ATTACK PENTAGON

11. (U) On 28 Sep 11, FBI agents arrested a U.S. citizen named Rezwan FERDAUS, after undercover agents learned he was planning to use a Remote Control (R/C) aircraft filled with explosives to target the Pentagon and/or the US Capitol Building. The intent was to cause a fire which would force an evacuation of the building, where he and some unidentified accomplices would have directed the evacuees using further small explosive charges into canalizing ground in hopes of forming a "kill zone". Finally, they would have used AK-47 and grenades to kill the remainder survivors trapped in the "kill zone".

12. (U) FERDAUS' intentions were revealed to the FBI by a source knowledgeable of the plan. Undercover FBI agents, posing as al-Qaeda members and recruiters, met with FERDAUS several times, receiving from him as many as 12 cellular phones modified to act as IED triggers. FERDAUS was gratified when he was told one of his modified phones had been used to kill US service personnel in Iraq stating, "That was exactly what I wanted". FERDAUS also supplied the FBI agents with an instructional video on how to convert a cell phone for use as a trigger. The FBI agents supplied three inert grenades, six non-functional AK-47, 1.25 pounds of real C4 plastic explosive and 24 pounds of imitation C-4 for the continuation of FERDAUS' alleged plan.

13. (U) On 13 May 11, FERDAUS conducted a reconnaissance of the prospective targets (US Capitol and Pentagon) as well as the planned R/C aircraft launch site at East Potomac Park. Details from this scouting were part of a detailed report provided to the undercover FBI Agents at another meeting in June 11.

14. (U) On 21 Jul 11, FERDAUS, using a false name, obtained a 1/10th scale R/C model aircraft with the intention of filling it with explosives, launching from East Potomac Park and flying it into either the Pentagon or US Capitol building. The R/C aircraft was stored, with the fake explosives, in a rental unit in Framingham, Massachusetts.

15. (C / **CI ANALYST COMMENT:** This incident shows the continued threat of individuals becoming self radicalized through the internet and planning attacks from within their home country. Those individuals who need to obtain technical knowledge in order to conduct an attack can garner it through the internet with little difficulty. There were no indications of a timeline for Mr. FERDAUS to launch his intended attack, although FBI agents felt the threat was imminent. Mr. FERDAUS is currently being held on a number of explosives and weapons charges related to his attack plans. The Unclassified information contained in Para 11 - 14 of this report was obtained from the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts Indictment of Rezwan

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FERDAUS, aka "Dave WINFIELD", aka "Jon RAMOS" issued 29 Sep 11, available through the US Department of Justice website. **END COMMENT**

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
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COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

RÉSUMÉ DE CONTRE-INGÉRENCE

October/ octobre 2011

CI INTSUM Covering the Period: (1-31 October 2011)

Résumé de CI couvrant la période: (du 1^{er} au 31 octobre 2011)

References: A. CI 760-001-09 (CFNCIU Standing Task)
B. DAOD 8002-1 (National Counter-Intelligence Program)

(U) Highlights:

Para 1: (U) Controlled items missing from warehouse – Halifax, NS

Para 5: (U) Occupy Protests come to Canada – Various Locations

Para 9: (U) Targeting of CF members –

Para 11: (U) Unsolicited Contact – Halifax, NS

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- SPARTAN: CDI / Disseminated Products / Products by Originator / DND / Counter-Intelligence
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- *Questions may be directed to (+CFNCIUINTCELL@NCIU.CMIL.CA) or*

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(U) DOMESTIC SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

(U) CONTROLLED ITEMS MISSING FROM WAREHOUSE - HALIFAX, NS

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1. (C/

2. (C/ **CI COMMENT:** This is believed to be a criminal act as the storage warehouse is located in a high crime area and the building has been broken into numerous times before. No CI Nexus has been identified at this time; however CFNCIU will continue to monitor the MP investigation in the event one is identified. **END COMMENT**

(U) SUSPICIOUS WHITE CRYSTALS IN PACKAGE - EDMONTON, AB

3. (C/ On 6 Oct 11, CFNCIU received reporting that a CF unit in Edmonton, AB had received a package containing unknown white crystals. Normal HAZMAT precautions were taken until the substance was identified as sugar. The HAZMAT controls were stood down and normal operations returned.

4. (C/ **CI COMMENT:** It is unknown how the sugar was introduced to the package.

CFNCIU

has identified no threat to DND/CF personnel or assets. CFNCIU will continue to monitor events similar to this. **END COMMENT**

(U) OCCUPY PROTESTS COME TO CANADA - VARIOUS LOCATIONS

5. (U) On 15 Oct 11, world wide supporters of the "Occupy Wall Street" launched a new initiative in which they occupied parks and other public areas. Dubbed "Occupy Together" and "Occupy Canada", protestors occupied parks in the Canadian cities of Halifax, Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, London, Windsor, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Edmonton, Calgary, Kamloops, Vancouver, and Victoria. Many of the parks are in the downtown area of the cities and received tentative blessings from the local municipality, with some imposed conditions usually related to hygiene, cleanliness, and safety within the protest camp.

6. (C/ **CI COMMENT:** The initial weekend of the protests appeared to have drawn the largest crowds. Since then, protest camps have become increasingly less inhabited, although the number of tents has not diminished. Protestor numbers increase on weekends and in the evenings when supporters are not working. Many Occupy camps appear to have attracted the local homeless population in addition to the core protestors. It is unknown how long the groups will continue once the Canadian winter sets in. Although some of the Canadian camps are located near DND/CF assets,

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the protests have remained peaceful and no threat to DND/CF personnel has been identified. **END COMMENT**

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(U) OCCUPY CANADIAN FORCES - FACEBOOK

7. (C/ On 26 Oct 11, a group named "Occupy Canadian Forces" was identified on the social networking site Facebook. The Facebook page had several posts encouraging CF members to exercise their free speech and post to the page. One post was noted that took the position that CF members should not post to the page, but encouraged others to post links and info on the page that CF members should see.

8. (C/ **CI COMMENT:** The Facebook page indicated from the outset that no discussion of conspiracy theories would be tolerated and that discussion of unlawful acts will be reported and removed by the moderator. The moderator and posters appeared to stay within these guidelines. The site appears to have been declared inactive by it's creator as it no longer appears in searches of Facebook. **END COMMENT**

(U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (FIS)

(U) TARGETING OF CF MEMBERS -

9. (C/ During a Port Visit (PVST) to CF members reported several suspicious occurrences. Events include:

a. (C/ conversations with who asked probing questions
Efforts to change the subject were ignored and the questioners produced stories with glaring inconsistencies;

b. (C/ questions from locals which indicate familiarity with the ships recent travels, in this case

CI COMMENT: It is possible that the individuals had gained information on the ship schedule from another crew member talking about it. **END COMMENT;** and

c. (C/ local merchants knew the purpose of the ships presence in
One businessman, when contracted to produce a painting of the warship, painted a vessel marked with the pennant number

CI COMMENT: CFNCIU agrees with the MAR INT assessment that most local nationals would know any

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Canadian or US warship in the region would be
END COMMENT

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10. (C/ **CI COMMENT:** It is deemed likely that made attempts
of collection against CF members What is not known is how many of the
reported incidents were conducted by
or how many were simply over enthusiastic locals looking to
get a business leg up on their competition. CFNCIU will be conducting detailed
Defensive Security Debriefs with CF members once the ship returns to home port.
END COMMENT

(U) UNSOLICITED CONTACT - HALIFAX, NS

11. (S/ On member received a request from a

The request for the publication was
denied.

12. (C **CI COMMENT:**

because the names, e-mail addresses, work addresses, and telephone numbers
are usually made available through published articles via
the internet and business cards given out at conferences. CFNCIU will continue to
monitor the situation. No threat to DND/CF personnel or assets was identified. **END
COMMENT**

(U) INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INCIDENT

13. (U) NSTR.

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Le but de ce résumé de contre-ingérence est d'informer et d'identifier les menaces possibles qui pèsent contre les Forces canadiennes (FC) et le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN), concernant le terrorisme, l'espionnage, la subversion et le sabotage, dans le but de réduire la vulnérabilité du personnel et des installations. De plus, le résumé présente certains événements d'intérêt pour maintenir la perception de la situation. L'information ou les renseignements peuvent également être protégés en vertu des articles 37 et 38 de la Loi sur la preuve au Canada. Cette information ou ces renseignements ne doivent être ni communiqués ni utilisés comme preuve sans consultation préalable avec l'Unité nationale de contre-espionnage des Forces canadiennes (UNCEFC)

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Canadian Forces
National Counter-Intelligence Unit
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Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0K2



Unité nationale de contre-espionnage
des Forces canadiennes
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Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0K2

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s.16(1)(a)

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

November/December 2011 – January 2012

CI INTSUM Covering the Period: (1 Nov 2011 – 31 Jan 2012)

References: A. CI 760-001-09 (CFNCIU Standing Task)
B. DAOD 8002-1 (National Counter-Intelligence Program)

(U) Highlights:

Para 1: (U) Civilian impersonating CF member – Winnipeg, MB

Para 5: (U) Canadian Civilian impersonating Military Police –

Para 9: (U) CF member arrested on espionage charges – Halifax, NS

Para 11: (U) Spear Phishing attempt towards CF members – Gagetown, NB

Please note, the CI Monthly INTSUM can be found at the following locations:

- CSNI/WEB PUBLISHING: CDI / CFNCIU / Intelligence / INTSUM
- SPARTAN: CDI / Disseminated Products / Products by Originator / DND / Counter-Intelligence
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(U) DOMESTIC SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

- (U) CANADIAN CIVILIAN IMPERSONATES CF MEMBER – WINNIPEG, MB s.15(1)
1. (S/ On 01 Nov 11, MP responding to a call from a local Cadet unit found an individual dressed in CADPAT who adamantly asserted he was a member of the CF. This Canadian Citizen provided a service number (SN) and a list of CF members from the local area who would vouch for him. s.16(1)(a)
indicated the SN was not valid. Once the Canadian Citizen was informed his information was not valid, he agreed to attend the MP Detachment and turn in the CADPAT uniform. s.16(1)(b)
s.19(1)
2. (S/ On 02 Nov 11 this person was subsequently arrested by the MP for impersonating a CF member. During an interview, the Canadian Citizen indicated that he had attempted to join the CF; however the trade he had wanted to join was full. s.19(1)
so as to portray himself as a member of the CF to his family and friends so as to appear successful. He would wear his CADPAT to family gatherings and claim he was “on duty” to build his story. A local newspaper ran a story of the Canadian Citizen regarding his deployment in 2009 as part of the PPCLI Battle Group to Afghanistan.
3. (S/
4. (C/ **CI COMMENT:** The Canadian Citizen claims to suffer from low self esteem and was envious of the respect the community had for CF members returning from overseas deployments. He then obtained CF clothing and convinced his family, friends and spouse he was a CF member. The Canadian Citizen carried this out over a period of at least three years.

no threat to DND/CF personnel or assets has been identified,

END COMMENT

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(U) CANADIAN CIVILIAN IMPERSONATING MP –

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5. (C /

s.16(1)(a)

6. (C // **CI COMMENT:**

END COMMENT

(U) PLANNED PROTEST – HALIFAX, NS

7. (C // In Dec 11, Source reporting indicated that the Halifax Peace Coalition was planning to conduct a peaceful protest at the gates of Stadacona in Halifax on 16 Jan 12. This group has conducted similar protests at this location previously and has always maintained a peaceful attitude.

8. (C // The protest was conducted as scheduled with four (4) persons in attendance. The theme of this protest was the planned purchase of F-35 fighter aircraft. Protestors were in attendance for approximately 45 minutes. No incidents were reported.

(U) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (FIS)

(U) CF MEMBER ARRESTED ON ESPIONAGE CHARGES – HALIFAX, NS

9. (U) On 14 Jan 12, OSINT reported that the RCMP had arrested SLt J.P. DELISLE in Halifax NS on charges related to the 2001 Security of Information Act. He is alleged to have communicated “to foreign entity information that the Government of Canada is taking measures to safeguard”. No information on which foreign entity he was reportedly been communicating with has been publicly released. SLt DELISLE is being held in custody pending a bail hearing scheduled for late Feb 12. None of the charges against SLt DELISLE have been proven in court.

10. (C/ **CI COMMENT:** CFNCIU is monitoring the RCMP investigation and conducting a parallel counter intelligence investigation. **END COMMENT**

(U) SPEAR PHISHING ATTEMPT – GAGETOWN, NB

11. (C// On 18 Nov 11, CFNCIU was alerted that a spear phishing type email message had been received at the DWAN email accounts of an unconfirmed number of CF members. Below is the original text contained in the email:

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12. (C) **CI COMMENT:**

no specific threat to DND/CF personnel or assets was identified in this incident,

END COMMENT

(U) INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INCIDENT

13. (U) On 25 Dec 11, the "hactivist" group known as "Anonymous" successfully breached the security of the STRATFOR Intelligence website and removed membership information for more than 857,000 accounts. Included in this information were the name, phone number, email address, password and credit card data of members.

CFNCIU

advises any DND/CF member with a STRATFOR account which shares a password with any other site to change their passwords as soon as possible. As well, affected members are advised to contact their financial institution for advice on the possibility of your credit card being compromised.

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Le but de ce résumé de contre-ingérence est d'informer et d'identifier les menaces possibles qui pèsent contre

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
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les Forces canadiennes (FC) et le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN), concernant le terrorisme, l'espionnage, la subversion et le sabotage, dans le but de réduire la vulnérabilité du personnel et des installations. De plus, le résumé présente certains événements d'intérêt pour maintenir la perception de la situation. L'information ou les renseignements peuvent également être protégés en vertu des articles 37 et 38 de la Loi sur la preuve au Canada. Cette information ou ces renseignements ne doivent être ni communiqués ni utilisés comme preuve sans consultation préalable avec l'Unité nationale de contre-espionnage des Forces canadiennes (UNCEFC).

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CHIEF OF DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE
CHEF DU RENSEIGNEMENT DE LA DEFENSE

Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit Quarterly Counter-Intelligence Summary September to December 2012



Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit
Unité nationale de contre-ingérence des Forces canadiennes

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INTRODUCTION

1. (S/ CFNCIU produced this summary to inform recipients on the type of threats that some DND/CF members were faced with during the reporting period. This summary focuses on threats emanating from individuals involved in the collection of information for potential use in acts of Terrorism, Espionage, Sabotage, Subversion and Organized Crime (TESSOC). The summary also demonstrates some instances where DND/CF members used poor OPSEC practices, which could have facilitated adversarial collection.

ELICITATION

2. (S/ **Attempts of elicitation.** An elicitation attempt means an adversary that is attempting to approach a DND/CF member and identify if he/she could be a potential candidate for recruitment with access to sensitive information. The final aim of elicitation is for the adversary to gain access to sensitive and classified information that they would otherwise not have access to. Here are incidents that have been reported:

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- a. (S/) **Case 1.** A DND/CF member attended a and after the course was contacted, via DWAN e-mail, by a who attended the same course. The CF member had exchanged his work DWAN address with other course participants, but not with this particular The had received the individual's e-mail address by another course mate whom the DND member had exchanged e-mail information with. The was able to contact the DND member, and invited him to to discuss issues together. The DND member politely declined the offer and has not been contacted by the individual since.
- b. (S/) **Case 2.** A DND/CF member who had traveled to I in the fall of 2012 for a holiday, met with who he subsequently started dating. While on holiday the member frequented a local bar and, once intoxicated, mentioned to the bartender that he would like to meet a The bartender subsequently introduced him to a who the member has been dating since. According to the member, it was love at first sight. The member's girlfriend then moved back to and he flew there to be introduced to her family in Dec 12. Although this report does not indicate any attempts at recruitment the
- c. (S/) **Case 3.** A DND/CF member who was browsing the internet, met with an unknown woman on a live web site. After a brief conversation, this unknown woman asked the member to take his clothes off, to which he complied. The pair then began masturbating while watching each other. Once this interaction was completed, the DND/CF member signed off the web site, at which point he received a personal email from the woman. Through the e-mail the woman advised the member that he had been filmed while masturbating and demanded a large sum of money to be sent to her via Western Union, or the video would be uploaded to a FACEBOOK page. The member immediately informed his family and Chain of Command of what had occurred. This member was likely a victim of simple internet extortion scam, to which he reacted in reasonable fashion. If the member would have complied with the request, the scam could have been possibly used to further manipulate and blackmail him in delivering sensitive DND information.
- d. (S/) **Case 4.** A DND/CF member was compromised by unknown persons, during Duty

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Travel (DT)
member frequented a local bar in
by a

The DND/CF
where he was approached

While intoxicated, the member was persuaded to provide
sensitive information

saved this information on
a phone, and proceeded to inform him of their intent to use such information
against him. The members' request to get the information deleted from the
device was denied. He later reported the incident to the CFNCIU. Although

SURVEILLANCE

3. (S/) **Attempts at surveillance.** Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. In Canada, only a few mandated governmental authorities can conduct domestic surveillance on individuals or establishments of interest. Any other type of surveillance is illegal, considered as "trespassing" by the Criminal Code of Canada, where an individual could face a summary conviction. The CFNCIU investigates cases where unknown individuals conduct unwarranted surveillance against DND/CF facilities and personnel, for the purpose of collecting information used during any TESSOC act.

a. (S/) **Case 1.** A DND/CF member was exiting on foot and proceeded to his vehicle when he noticed an SUV parked along the fence line in a no-parking zone. He noticed that the sole occupant of the vehicle was holding a DSLR-type camera, which he lowered on his lap once detected. The SUV driver then drove away, at which time the DND/CF member contacted the Military Police and passed on the license plate. The SUV driver was however there where no further grounds to continue police activity.

b. (S/) **Case 2.** A DND/CF member was invited to participate in a "get together" being held at the downtown The get together included DND/CF members and other governmental agencies, which all gathered for lunch. While sitting at one of the balconies overlooking an adjacent street, the aforementioned member noticed an unknown male and female standing by the sidewalk, taking pictures of the conference participants sitting at the table. The member

(S/)

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noticed the male using a DSLR-type camera, while the female used a point-and-shoot smaller device. The DND/CF member left the establishment in an attempt to challenge both individuals, at which point both suspects fled the scene on foot. The DND/CF member returned to the establishment to rejoin his group and finish his lunch. An hour passed, and the couple reappeared at the same original point, pretending to consult a map. One of the group's participants which startled them, at which point they rapidly departed the scene.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY

4. (S)) **Operational Security (OPSEC).** CFNCIU often deals with cases where a DND/CF member demonstrates poor judgment, and disregards all OPSEC theories and principles, making themselves and other DND members vulnerable to TESSOC activities. The following examples demonstrate situations where DND/CF members exposed themselves unnecessarily, whether because of inexperience, or ignorance of TESSOC threats.

a. (S)) **Case 1.** A DND/CF member had posted a video of himself flying a CF-18 Fighter Aircraft on Facebook. The video has been removed from the social media site since the incident was reported.

b. (S)) **Case 2.** A DND/CF member was reported to have posted a message to his ex-girlfriend on a social network site, informing her on The member was reprimanded by his Chain of Command (CoC) for his actions.

c. (S)) **Case 2.** A DND/CF member stated during a conversation with a DND peer that he believed his personal computer had been compromised by hackers. During an interview it was discovered that the DND member also experienced a separate incident where he was reportedly befriended by a member was invited on the internet. where the DND/CF who he had previously met had in fact invited the member to an

When the investigator asked the member if he believed this attempt to court his friendship had anything to do with

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Such attitude towards OPSEC usually is an indicator of a DND/CF member's unwillingness to recognize the threat,

CONCLUSION (U)

5. (S/ CFNCIU will continue to assist DND/CF members involved in activities that could expose them to TESS threats. We assess that events similar to the aforementioned ones are often an

Any DND/CF members that experience similar situations should contact the CFNCIU as soon as possible. See the CFNCIU Intranet Website (DWAN) at "<http://cdi.mil.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page-3029>" for contact information of the CFNCIU Detachment nearest you.

6. (U) For questions related to this CI Summary, please contact the CFNCIU Ops O at the CFNCIU HQ,

Please note, the CFNCIU Quarterly Counter-Intelligence Summary can be found at the following locations:

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(S/