# Synergising Network Analysis Tradecraft

Network Tradecraft Advancement Team
(NTAT)

Overview

* ## What is the NTAT?

* ## 2011 – 2012 work and accomplishments

Tradecraft?

Tradecraft

- "The development of methods, techniques, algorithms and processes in order to generate Intelligence, and developing the ability to apply this knowledge either manually or through automation. Tradecraft is developed from experience, research, intuition and by the reapplication and redefinition of existing techniques. **Industrial-Scale Tradecraft** involves data on a large scale."

Network Tradecraft

- Usable knowledge about how to acquire intelligence FROM the network

The NTAT

* Create **repeatable**, **sustainable** & **shareable** tradecraft to enable network analysis

* Facilitate knowledge collaboration and interchange across the 5-Eyes SIGDEV community

The Process

Stage 1 = Fact Finding

Stage 2 = Define Focus (based on Fact Finding)

Stage 3 = Develop Tradecraft

Stage 4 = Document Tradecraft

Stage 5 = Test Documented Tradecraft and Refine

Network Convergence Tradecraft

* Technological convergence – where voice and data services interact with each other on a single device

* Tradecraft to enable the targeting of handsets in telephony space and CNE exploitation in IP space

* Improved algorithms for mobile gateway identification and implementation of these algorithms

DSD Workshop November 2011

* 2 weeks
  * CSE, DSD, GCHQ
  * Virtually, via chat room, NSA & GCSB
* Focus on data, techniques & analytic outcomes

https://wiki.dsd/twiki/ ███████████
███████

DSD Workshop Outcomes

Technique developed to identify wide variety of potential converged data, unique for specific country or mobile network operator

- Ø *potentially lead to convergence correlation dataset to help profile targets on-line activity*

Documentation of techniques to identify specific components of raw HTTP activity that alludes to the browsing, downloading and installation of smartphone applications

- Ø *identified the presence of application servers for mobile network operators and geographical areas*

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- Ø *three agencies now running the same analytic provides a richer dataset of mobile gateways*

CRAFTY SHACK trial

- Ø *NTAT now using CRAFTY SHACK for tradecraft documentation*

XKS Microplugin: Samsung Protocol

Samsung Protocol

Help | Actions ▾ | Reports ▾ | View ▾ | Map View | FILTERS: ▾

	State	ID	cCsc	Device_Model	HTTP_User_Agent	Imei ▾	Latest_Mcc	Mcc	Message_Id	Message_Type	Mnc	Network_Ty	Odc_Versio	oaded_	Postloaded_	Preloaded_	Preloaded_apps	Version	Active User/t	Casenotation
1		353	KSA	GT-N7000	SAMSUNG-Android			412	2306-8	checkAppUpgrade Request	50	0	2.6.084				com.sec.android.app.samsungapps@2	1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
2		566	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021				com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		E9DHL00000M0000
3		648	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-1	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021				com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		E9DHL00000M0000
4		649	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-1	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021				com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		E9DHL00000M0000
5		1260	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021				com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		E9DHL00000M0000
6		1261		GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250										com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		E9DHL00000M0000
7		1262	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-3	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021				com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0		E9DHL00000M0000
8		1274	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-4	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021				com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
9		1	AUT	GT-P7500	SAMSUNG-Android			250	2306-5	checkAppUpgrade Request	01	0	3.0.021					3.0		E9DHL00000M0000
10		67																3.0		E9DHL00000M0000
11		433	SKZ	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android			412	2306-0	checkAppUpgrade Request	20	0	2.6.148					3.0		E9DHL00000M0000
12		463	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2350-0	getPushNotificationMessage Re	20	0						3.0		E9DHL00000M0000
13		1074	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2350-0	getPushNotificationMessage Re	20	0						3.0		NFDJR00000M0171
14		786	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2309-0	getDownloadList Request	20	0						3.0		NFDJR00000M0171
15		1110	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2308-0	getKillList Request	20	0					com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
16		664	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2301-0	getUpgradeNKillCount Request	20	0				cn.wps.mc 173	android@2.3.5@0||android.tts@2.3.	1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
17		360						412										1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
18		362	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2301-0	getUpgradeNKillCount Request	50	0					com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
19		490	XEU	GT-I9100				412	2309-0	getDownloadList Request	50	0				cn.wps.mc 173	android@2.3.5@0||android.tts@2.3.	1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
20		572	XEU	GT-I9100				412										1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
21		961	XEU					412	2306-5	checkAppUpgrade Request	40	0	2.6.122					1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
22		964	THR	GT-B5512	SAMSUNG-Android			412	2302-2	upgradeListEx Request	20	0	2.6.194				com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
23		965	XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android			412	2160-6	purchaseDetailEx Request	20	0	2.6.194				com.sec.android.app.samsungapp	1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
24		968	XSG	GT-I9100				412										1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
25		1259	XSG	GT-I9100				412	2306-2	checkAppUpgrade Request	20	0	2.6.048			cn.wps.mc 173	android@2.3.5@0||android.tts@2.3.	1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
26		1344	XSG	GT-I9100	SAMSUNG-Android			412										1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
27		1400	TOP SECRET//SI/F	2012-05-11 16:42:51		2012-05-11 16:42:51				checkAppUpgrade Request	20	0	2.6.048					1.0a		E9DHL00000M0000
28		54	TOP SECRET//SI/F	2012-05-11 06:43:27		2012-05-11 06:43:27	412	412	2300-0	countrySearchEx Request	20	0						3.0		E9DHL00000M0000
29		417	TOP SECRET//SI/F	2012-05-13 02:32:35		2012-05-13 02:32:35			2200-1	countrySearch Request		111						1.0		E9DHL00000M0000
30		488	TOP SECRET//SI/F	2012-05-11 09:32:36		2012-05-11 09:32:39		412	5060-1	termInformation Request	20	0	2.6.048					1.0		E9DHL00000M0000

CSE Workshop
February 2012

* 2 weeks
    * CSE, DSD, GCHQ, GCSB, NSA – everyone wanted to experience a Canadian winter!
    * Build on the work started at DSD

Winter Nirvana

The Reality!

CSE Workshop Outcomes

Refinement of XKS fingerprints to identify mobile bearers, Samsung and Android Marketplace servers

Ø *17 XKS fingerprints deployed*

Documentation of analytics in CRAFTY SHACK

Ø *These analytics are now being implemented across the 5 Eyes*

Proving the tradecraft actually works!

Ø *Scenario to test the tradecraft and analytics – Op IRRITANT HORN*

Op IRRITANT HORN

© AP Photo

Op IRRITANT HORN
Does the tradecraft work?

* Another Arab Spring (only this time, different countries)
* Goal: identify aggregation points for the mobile networks in the countries of interest using the tradecraft developed during the workshops
* Did it work? YES -> the team was able to identify connections from the countries to application and vendor servers in non 5-Eyes countries
* So what? We found some servers....
  Ø Potential MiTM
  Ø Effects
  Ø Harvesting data at rest
  Ø Harvesting data in transit

Finding mobile application & vendor update servers

Finding mobile application & vendor update servers

100%

Congo	

france	android-market.l.google.com
france	android-market.l.google.com
france	android-market.l.google.com
france	android-market.l.google.com
france	android-market.l.google.com

Senegal

cuba	store.cubava.cu
cuba	store.cubava.cu
senegal	srv_applis.sar.sn

Sudan

morocco	boungeontelephone.com
switzerland	download-force.com
bahamas	supportapple.com
cuba	store.cubava.cu
netherlands	mobile.ero-advertising.com
russia	lady.marketgid.info

TC Init   Geolocation and

IP input

Select valuesIP-IP Communic

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▶   Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network

Page   Discussion   History ✎ Edit

SECRET

💡 Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network

[**5 EYES** | CSEC | DSD | GCHQ | GCSB | NSA | Factbox]

⚙ Metadata

What does the tradecraft achieve?

- This tradecraft will provide a list of servers that have been seen communicating with a mobile network.

In what situations would this tradecraft be most useful?

- To identify mobile application servers for a specific network
- To identify any server that may be useful for collection purposes

Describe any problems, caveats or things to watch out for

- The list of servers returned depends on the the IP range and collection sources utilized. Success of this tradecraft may require additional research to identify other IP ranges or requesting other agencies to check their collection to identify different servers.

Links that can help you to implement this tradecraft

Created by:	▮▮▮▮▮▮▮		Difficulty: ⭐⭐⭐	Acceptance state:	Limited
Agency:	NSA				
Email Address:	▮▮▮▮▮▮▮				

Input(s):	Ontology:Network block, Ontology:Ip address	Output(s):	Ontology:Ip address, Ontology:ASN, Ontology:Network block, Ontology:Hostname, Ontology:User Agent String, Ontology:Geographic selector

Invokes Tradecraft:
- Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
- Finding Mobile Internet Gateways

Input(s):	Ontology:Network block, Ontology:Ip address	Output(s):	Ontology:Ip address, Ontology:ASN, Ontology:Network block, Ontology:Hostname, Ontology:User Agent String, Ontology:Geographic selector

Invokes Tradecraft:
- Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
- Finding Mobile Internet Gateways

Alternatives:
- Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network

🚦 5 EYES Tradecraft Steps (document underlying analytic, do not include tools)   [edit]

The IP ranges utilized for the initial implementation of this tradecraft were the Inter PLMN Backbone IP ranges obtained from IR21 documents. For other methods of identifying mobile IP blocks, see the invoked tradecraft listed above.

Step 1) Take IP ranges or individual addresses identified as being related to mobile network communications.
Step 2) Obtain geolocation information and network ownership information for each IP address. This should include: Network Owner name, Carrier name, ASN, Continent, Country, Region, City, Lat/Long, and any other related details that your system can obtain.
Step 3) Obtain Internet communication events related to the IP addresses. These events should minimally include: source information, To IP, From IP, TCP Direction, and HTTP User-Agent.
Step 4) Sort the results and dedup them. This step depends on your collection sources.
Step 5) Filter out server communications that have user-agents that aren't useful. Further analysis is needed to identify the non-useful user-agents (cheat sheet needed). Ex friendly-scanner
Step 6) Check the TCP Direction field:
- If Server to Client, grab the From IP information
- If Client to Server, grab the To IP information
- If Server to Server, grab both the To and From IP information
- If Unknown, capture in an error log

Step 7) Sort and dedup again based on Server IP information. TCP Direction info is no longer needed.
Step 8) Obtain geolocation information and network ownership information for each Server IP. This is done for the servers that were not in the original IP Blocks.
Step 9) Remove any servers that are not useful. This may include 5-Eyes servers.
Step 10) Output
- List of Servers
- List of related User Agents
- List of related hostnames

💬 **Comments (2)** | Show comments   Average article quality based on 1 rating(s) 🔼

Last updated 24/2/2012 by ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

Category: Tradecraft

CRAFTY SHACK - *"It's not tradecraft until it's documented!* - ▮▮▮▮ *CSEC"*   [edit]

Identifying servers communicating with an MNO

Profiling mobile application servers

Profiling mobile application servers

Profiling mobile application servers

Top 10 values

62907100
62907100
62907100
62907100
62907100
62907100
62907100
62907100
62907100
62907100

Field discovery is: On

< Hide

2 selected fields   Edit

ᵃ HTTP_User_Agent (18)

ᵃ source (1)

38 interesting fields

ᵃ Application (1)
\# ASN (4)
ᵃ Carrier (4)
ᵃ Case_Notation (1)
ᵃ City (5)
\# Client_ASN (1)
ᵃ Client_Carrier (1)
ᵃ Client_City (1)
ᵃ Client_Country (1)
ᵃ Client_Digraph (1)
ᵃ Client_IP_Range (1)
ᵃ Client_Owner (1)
ᵃ Country (4)
ᵃ Digraph (4)
ᵃ host (1)
ᵃ Hostname (8)
ᵃ HTTP_Via (1)
ᵃ Identifier (≥100)
ᵃ index (1)
ᵃ IP (8)
ᵃ IP_From (1)

18 results over all time

≡ ▦ 📊   ✓ Options

▸ Formatting options

Chart bars (descending):
- ZTE-G-S213/WAP2.0
- Nokia5310XpressMus...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- WinWAP/3.2 Profile/...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- SAMSUNG-SGH-L170/...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- SAMSUNG-SGH-F250/....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
- SAMSUNG-SGH-D600....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
- SAMSUNG-S3500/1.0 ...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- SAMSUNG-GT-S3653...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- SAMSUNG-GT-E2121B....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
- SAMSUNG-GT-C3303...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- SAMSUNG-GT-C3010....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
- SAMSUNG-GT-B3210...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- SAMSUNG-C5212/C5...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- SAMSUNG-B5702/B57...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- Opera/9.80 (S60; Sy...2.7.81 Version/11.00
- Nokia6300/2.0 (06.01...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- Nokia6233/2.0 (04.5...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
- LG-GU230/V10i Obig...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1

X-axis: 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65

Client_Owner (categorical)   ⊠

Appears in 100% of results
Show only events with this field
Select and show in results

Charts
Top values by time
Top values overall

Values   #   %
warid congo   102   100%

* Results based on mobile application servers seen in CSE collection

* We have a list of the most popular smartphones for Warid Congo customers and their IMSIs

TOP SECRET//SI

Success Stories

* UCWeb mobile browser identification
    * Discovered by GCHQ analyst during DSD workshop

    * Chinese mobile web browser – leaks IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI and device characteristics

UCWeb

* Led to discovery of active comms channel from ████████████████

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The CONVERGENCE team helped discover an active communication channel originating from ██████████ that is associated with the ██ ████████ as they are known within the ██████ hierarchy area of responsibility is for covert activities in Europe, North America, and South America. The customer ████████ leveraged a **Convergence Discovery capability that enabled the discovery of a covert channel associated with smart phone browser activity in passive collection**. The covert channel originates from users who use UCBrowser (mobile phone compact web browser). **The covert channel leaks the IMSI, MSISDN, Device Characteristics, and IMEI back to server(s) in** ████████████████████ Initial investigation has determined that perhaps malware can be associated when the covert channel is established. ████████ covert exfil activity identifies SIGINT opportunity where potentially none may have existed before. Target offices that have access to X-KEYSCORE can search within this type of traffic based on their IMSI or IMEI to determine target presence.

UCWeb – XKS Microplugin

Vision of Success

* Shared convergence database with numerous different sources, methods & tradecraft feeding into it

* Ultimately correlating telephony and Internet TDIs with some degree of confidence

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  Ø Effects
  Ø Harvesting data at rest
  Ø Harvesting data in transit

TOP SECRET//SI

MiTM – exploit the application server and use it as a MiTM platform for handset exploitation

Effects – exploitation of the application servers could make it possible to provide selective misinformation to the targets handsets

Harvesting data at rest – exploitation of the applications servers could provide access to a wealth of information at rest. The amount and usefulness of this information depends on the application in question

Harvesting data in transit – mobile applications servers often send and receive data that SIGINT agencies find useful (e.g. the Samsung protocol sending client and handset details to a server in Germany)

The results above are from a tradecraft to find servers of applications and vendor updaters servers from given countries, The rationale behind this is to identify servers that target within those countries might visit which could be exploited by CNE to push a phone implant capability.

The tradecraft relies upon 5 tuple data seen from the mobile gateways from target countries and to servers which have matching 'key words' in the hostname. The results above could then be scoped for CNE to see if they would be valid boxes to use an access platform.

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TOP SECRET//SI

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